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The role of the state, priva te domestic firms, and foreign firms has changed
substantially in recent years throughout Latin America's economies. An almost
universall y accepted goal in the 1990s seems to be to reduce the presence of the state in
the region's economies, to reduce state regulations, to encourage the growth of the
private domestic sector, and to welcome the participation of foreign capital not only in
manufacturing industries, but also in areas reserved for the state for the 1ast half
century (such as public utilities and the exploitation of natural resources).
This is quite a change from the mood that prevailed in most of Latin America during
the heyday of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) in the three decades following
World War n. Then, state firms dominated public utilities, the exploitation of natural
resources, and some basic industries (like petroleum refining and steel), and was a
prominent player in banking, petrochemicals, and some other industries. A longer
view, however, reveals that the current privatization thrust might not be a 180- but
rather a 360-degree swing, since in the early decades of this century the private sector
(especially foreign capital) was dominant in extractive industries and public utilities.
We shall first review the role of the public and private sectors in distinct periods of
Latin America's development-the pre-1S1 period, when primary exports were the
leading sector; the ISI period, which spanned the period from the Great Depression of
the 1930s to the 1960s; and the two decades (the 1970s and the 1980s) when the
region suffered external (oil prices and interest rate) shocks, became heavily indebted,
and then stagnated during the debt crisis decade of the 1980s. We shall then examine
implications of the privatization trend in Latin America-its promises and pitfalls, its
implication for a new state rol e in the economy, the extent to which it will require a
more open economy, and its implication for a new growth model for the region.
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The Period of Primary-Ied Export Growth
During the rapid expansion of world trade that began in the latter part of the nineteenth
century and lasted until World War 1, the Latin American economies became
specialized in the exportation of primary goods. Most countries of the region relied on
a small number of food products and/or raw material s for their foreign exchange
earnings, and most imports consisted of manufactured products. The production of
exportable goods was undertaken by the private domestic sector (e.g., coffee in Brazil,
grains and livestock in Argentina) and by the foreign sector (e.g., copper and other
mineral s in Chile, Peru, and Mexico; petroleum in Mexico and Venezuela; plantation
agriculture in Central America, Peru, and Colombia). Foreign firms also often
dominated commercial operations sUITounding these exports. In addition, a substantial
amount of foreign investment went into infrastructure, such as railroads, urban
transportation, power generation and distribution, and the telephone system. The
direct involvement of the state was relatively small, though in several cases it assumed
direct ownership of railroads, which were constructed with foreign financing.1
Tbe state provided a favorable atmosphere for private investment in that periodo For
instance, it often guaranteed arate of return for foreign companies that invested in
railroads; or taxes were relatively low on foreign firms investing in primary export
sectors. Regulations were at a minimum and, where they existed, especially in the
public utilities sector, they were usually favorable to foreign firms.
During most of this period the region had a free trade regime. Most import tariffs
existed to raise revenues and were not protective in nature. Where the private sector
was unwilling to enter, especially in providing credit to the agricultural sector, the state
in a number of countries established banks. And in the provision of social services-
health and education-the state's presence was relatively weak (there were so me
exception, such as the large investments in Argentinian education in the latter part of
the nineteenth century). Of course, the population was mainly rural, which meant that
the pressure for the provision of social services was relatively weak.
The ISI Period: From the 19308 to the 19608
The presence of the state grew rapidly in this periodo Earlier in the century some
governments had bought out railroads, as they were unwilling to continue to guarantee
arate of return to foreign enterprises. The depression of the 1930s, however, marked
the beginning of a more active state in the economy. Controls began to proliferate-
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exchange controls, direct foreign trade control s, controls over tariffs charged by public
utilities, production and marketing control s of agricultural and other primary products.
By the late 1930s Mexico had nationalized its petroleum and some mining sectors.
This nationalization served as a precedent for the nationalization of the petroleum and
mining sectors in other countries of the region during the 1950s and the 1960s.
Nationalist governments felt that control over nonrenewab1e resources should be in the
hands of the state.2
The growing government takeover of public utilities-railroads, power generation
and distribution, telecommunications, and so on-was in part the result of govemment
perception that these strategic sectors should be in the hands of the sta te. It was also
the result of public utility tariff controls, which did not allow for adequate rates of
return for their foreign owners. The latter were thus unwilling to make investments
that would serve the needs of rapidly industrializing and urbanizing countries. The
state therefore felt it necessary to nationalize public utilities, and the new state firms in
these sectors received the necessary subsidies to modernize and expand power
generation and distribution, telecommunications, and the like.
The adoption of ISI as the principal development strategy not only led many
govemments to expand their public utilities, but also established state-owned firms in a
number of basic industries, especially in the steel, metallurgical, and petrochemical
sectors. The motivation was partially nationalist, but also was due to the fact that
neither domestic nor foreign private firms were willing to pour large amounts of
money into projects whose gestation period was relatively long. Finally, through the
establishment of development banks (such as Brazil's BNDES, Mexico's Nacional
Financiera, and Chile's CORFO), Latin American governments became important
players in influencing the direction of investment resources and in influencing the
private sector either through financing operations or through shareholder participation.
The ISI period witnessed a dramatic change in the role of foreign capital in the
region's economies. Most Latin American governments realized that neither the
domestic private sector nor the public sector had the technical and financial capacity to
establish ISI industries rapidly. It was thus important to induce foreign firms to
establish subsidiaries in new import-substituting sectors. This was achieved through a
policy of protection, which was comp1emented by special inducements-such as tax
holidays, and the permission to import machinery without foreign exchange cover.
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Manufacturing, rather than public utilities, mining, and agriculture, thus became
foreign capital's major field of operation.
The private domestic sector was not neglected in this periodo It al so benefited from
protection and received subsidized loans from government development banks and
other favors. In a number of countries there was an emphasis on rapidly increasing
the vertical integration of new sectors. Thus multinationals were encouraged to make
or buy components in the country. Domestic firms often became suppliers of
mu1tinationals and in the process acquired new technological capacities.
For a while during the ISI process the state, the domes tic private sector, and private
foreign firms worked together. They complemented and therefore strengthened each
other. The presence of the state in this period "crowded in" rather than "crowded out"
the private domestic and foreign sectorso
Origins of the Decay of Public Enterprise: The Crises of the 1973-1991
Period
The debt and inflation crises of the 1970s and the 1980s contributed significantIy to the
decline in the dynamism and efficiency of public sector firms and, over the course of
almost two decades, many became a liability to the government. 3 In Mexico the deficit
of public enterprises as a proportion of total public sector deficit was over 100 percent
in the second half of the 1970s (Leo, the deficit of public enterprises was larger than
the total public sector deficit, since the public sector, excluding public enterprises,
showed a surplus). In Brazil public enterprise revenues as a proportion of GDP
averaged about 16 percent in the first half of the 1980s, while expenditures averaged
about 18 percent. 4 The oil shock s of the 1970s forced many Latin American
policymakers to choose between slowing economic growth to adjust to new
international prices or bOITowing to finance the continued expansion of their
economies. Many governments chose to pursue continued growth and public
enterprises were used to capture foreign resources.5
In the 1970s, Latin American public enterprises began bOITowing from commercial
banks rather than from the multilateral development banks, which had been their prime
source of foreign capital in the previous decade. As the economic crisis wore on in the
industrialized countries and international interest rates became sharply positive, many
Latin American countries became increasingly desperate to obtain foreign exchange to
meet their rapidIy growing debt servicing needs. They turned to their public enterprises
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to attract additional external finance. Many state enterprises had a good reputation in
international financia! markets at the time and were forced by their central governments
to borrow more money than was needed for their investment plans. Thus, by the
1980s many state firms had huge foreign debts whose servicing placed them in a
precarious [mancial situation.
Public enterprises were also used by central governments to address the rising costs
of inflation. Many Latin American governments began to use state enterprises as
macroeconomic stabilization instruments. To this end, prices of steel, electricity,
water, and telephone and transportation services were not allowed to accompany the
general rise in the price level, but were forcibly frozen or allowed to rise at only a
modest rateo In Brazil, for instance, the real prices of iron and steel products (a sector
dominated by state enterprises) declined by 50 percent between January 1979 and
December 1984; of electricity tariffs, by 40 percent; and of telephone tariffs, by 60
percent.6 In Mexico, producer prices in the private sector increased more than 122
times between 1980 and mid-1990, while public enterprise prices increased by les s
than a factor of 110.7 If petroleum prices are excluded, however, the prices of other
Mexican public enterprises rose faster than private sector prices. One has 10 consider,
however, that the state-controlled Mexican petroleum sector dominated state
enterprises and had an enormous weight in Mexican price formation. While public
enterprise prices were held down to he1p control the general increase in the price level,
the policy destroyed the financia! position of the enterprises.
The use of public enterprises to capture foreign financial resources and provide
macroeconomic stability undermined their microeconomic efficiency and identity
firms. It also ultimately worsened the central government deficit. To the extent that a
firm's losses were covered by government subsidies, they contributed to the increase
in general government expenditures, to the government deficit (assuming that such
subsidies could not be covered by increased taxes), and thus to further inflation. In
addition, to the extent that the financiallosses of state firms resulted in a curtailment of
investments, their efficiency declined further and so did their capacity to increase total
output.
As public enterprises became less like firms and more like macroeconomic policy
tools, the opportunity for economic and political abuse expanded. Where state firms
were the sole producers of certain products that were crucial inputs for private firms,
deliveries were often late unless an "urgency tax" (bribe) was paid. Or, where the
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private sector had state finns as the major customers, payments were often delayed
beyond the time stated in contracts, unless side payments were made to obtain a
quicker release of the money. Such monopolistic abuses increased the private sector's
costs and thus reduced the general efficiency of the economy. 8
The use of public enterprises for attaining certain distributional goals has also
contributed to the weakening of their microeconomic position. The control of public
utility prices to favor lower income groups or productive sectors of the economy that
the government wished to promote contributed to lower profits or increased losses of
public sector finns. Of course, such losses could be subsidized by the state through
higher taxes, but this was often politically impossible. The only feasible optíon for the
government was to subsidize the firms, adding to its own budget deficit, or not to
subsidize them and allow the firm's effectiveness in attaining its original goal s to be
diminished.9
While the use of public enterprises for macroeconomic policy objectives may have
had negatíve repercussions for the financial health of the finn, the benefits of their use
might be thought to have outweighed the cost. The abuse of public enterprises for
political purposes, however, has had a more decidedly negative effect. Under military
governments, many Latin American public enterprises undertook grandiose projects
whose scale were overwhelming and usefulness questionable. With the
redemocratization of most Latín American countries in the 1980s, pressures to increase
employment beyond the needs of the firms or to hire executives whose qualifications
are more political than technical are increasing. There may also be pressure on public
enterprises to locate public finns' new investments in politically desirable rather than in
economically optímal places.lO Such political interference substantially reduces the
efficiency of public finns and demoralizes their professional staffs. Of course, under
authoritarian regimes such abuses also took place. Moreover, under such regimes,
there was usually no free press to investigate and expose abuses in the use of state
enterprises.
Trends in the 1990s
The ISI strategy has outlived its usefulness, the debt decade of the 1980s is finally
over, and an era of liberalizatíon and privatization is well under way throughout Latín
America. A new consensus regarding the role of the public and private sectors is
beginning to emerge, based on several new trends and developments. A further
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examination of these new regionwide developments will help set the stage for a
glimpse into the future in Latin America for the rest of the 1990s.
Gradual Opening of Borders
Latín America cannot export more without more efficient firms, and efficiency can be
achieved only by having firms, which previously operated in a protected market,
become exposed to international competition. This had led to a gradual opening of
borders, with nearly all governments now allowing more imports of more modern
technology. This opening has benefited local consumers and has al so led to more
exports by local industry. The conventional wisdom of the 1980s was that Latin
America could not afford to allow more imports because it needed to generate trade
surpluses to service the debt. Now it is recognized that governments cannot afford to
keep their borders closed and that more imports willlead to more exports and a higher
standard of living.
This gradual opening of borders has also helped revive discussions about regional
trading blocs, such as MERCOSUR and the Andean group. They may be transformed
from the impossible dreams of the 1960s into realities in the 1990s. But it may not be
enough, as we shall see shortly.
Privatization of State Enterprises
The objective of most countries today is to withdraw the public sector from most
productive activities, and some countries are even aiming to privatize public utilities
(this has already occurred in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico). By withdrawing from
direct participation in most economic activities, the state may be able to reduce the
deficits that led to the borrowing and inflationary spiral of the 1970s and the 1980s.
As the case studies in the Property Rights, Privatization, and Regulation in Latin
America conference reveal, privatization is being carried out in a variety of ways.
Some state firms are being privatized through sales to foreign firms (both public and
private), often involving debt-for-equity swaps. The immediate benefit of such
privatization is 10 provide additional income to governments, which underwent a
substantial fiscal squeeze throughout the 1980s. A1though the sale of government
enterprise involves only a one-time income for the state, it also reduces longer-term
government expenditures by reducing the debt servicing usually required and freeing
the state from having to provide subsidies to loss-making state enterprises.
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Deregulation of L{)CalIndustry
While opening e borders and pL atization have grabbed most of the headlines in
recent years, there has been another important trend. Governments have been
gradually reducing their control over the daily activities of firms. Price control boards
have been abolished, import permits for many goods have been eliminated, and
governments no longer set wage policies (often because they no longer own the
enterprises that used to be the trend setters in wages).
The Growth ofthe Informal Economy
This trend began in the 1970s, as many people became informal entrepreneurs
operating outside of the formal economic system and usually earning only subsistence
wages. This was a response to the stifling control of the state. Many caIl it the first
move toward privatization, as these entrepreneurs began their activities in areas in
which the state enterprises and government did not perform effectively. In the 1980s,
the informal economy served as a safety net for individual s left without jobs during the
recession of that periodo The challenge for the 1990s is to incorporate them back into
the formal economy.
The Emergence ofThree Major Trading Regions
Europe '92 has already led to nearly complete trade liberalization within Western
Europe and rationalization of many industries. Now trade and investment have been
expanded to include Eastern Europe as well. The vision of a European trading region
is quickly becoming a reality. In Asia, Japan has quietIy led the formation of an
equaIly powerful trading region, which includes Korea and South Asia today, and
which may include China in the future. Japan's huge industries have invested
massively throughout the region, and trade is based more on company-to-company
trade than on government-to-government cooperation.
North America is close to forming the North American Free Trade Agreement
(linking Mexico 10 the United Statés and Canada), so other countries in Latin America
may have to decide whether to join the North American trading region (and open their
economies even further) or attempt to trade with all regions. Countries like Chile and
Venezuela have already decided to link their future more closely with North America.
But Brazil and Argentina, with their closer ties to Europe, are more reluctant to
decide, and so have focused on the more modest MERCOSUR.
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Challengefor the Future: An Effective Post-ISI State
While Latin America has undergone its most far-reaching structural changes in the last
sixty years, the world around it has been changing even more rapidly, making the
changes in Latin America seem modest or even timid in so me countries. Other
countries have opened their borders more completely and privatized their industries
more rapidly.
Latin American governments no longer have the funds to invest direcdy in order to
spur growth and development, so they must attract investment into the region. But in
the present world circumstances, they have to compete for those investments funds
against other regions and governments with longer and more successful performance
records.
The old ISI strategy has been replaced by these new thrusts based on opening of
borders and privatization. While these changes were necessary in order to correct the
problems of past decades, they are not sufficient for the 1990s. The role of an
effective post-ISI state is still to be defined and delineated. The focus of most states in
the 1990-1992 period was to tear down the old state, with les s attention given to
construction for the 1990s. The elements of that new role, however, are beginning to
emerge:
1. state investment in social infrastructure, especially hea1th and education, and the
creation of a mínimal social safety net for all of its citizens;
2. creation of a broader and more equitable tax system, which allows more money
to be collected more equitably and avoids the temptation to return to the
inflationary finance so widely used in the past;
3. the state as a regulatory agency for public services and natural monopolies.
Although the state no longer owns most of the industries that provide most
public services, it faces the same challenges that were so difficult to resolve one
hundred years ag~how to regulate public transportation, telephones, utility
companies, and so on, and balance the conflicting needs for low-cost public
services versus reinvestment in these areas based on a reasonable profit. It is not
clear yet who the regulators should be and how they can be protected from undue
pressure from interest groups. Are the regulatory models of the United States,
or the European countries, or Japan relevant to the institutional situation of the
Latin American countries?
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4. encouragement of rather than ambivalence toward foreign investment. In a
privatized and pen economy, the treatment of foreign capital has to be devoid of
the type of special control s that nationalistic farces exercised after World War n,
but also of the special deals of the nineteenth century, which often amounted to
exploitation;
5. encouragement of local capital to stay in the country. The liberalization of recent
years has attracted a substantial amount of flight capital back to home countries,
especially to Mexico, Chile, and Argentina. Some of this capital has been
invested in state firms that are being privatized, but much of it has been invested
in regional stock markets. Governments now seem to recognize that, if they
cannot persuade their local investors to keep their money in the country, they will
not be successful at attracting foreign capital, which has become a centerpiece of
their development strategies;
6. formation of regional capital markets. While flight capital has led to the recent
boom in local stock markets, the development of these capital markets is crucial
to long-term development. Government regulation must stop insider traders
from making speculative profits by manipulating markets. This will give more
investors the confidence to increase their investments and make regional capital
markets a magnet for foreign capital;
7. more equitable distribution of income. None of these new policies will be
successful or sustainable unless governments can reverse the record of the last
twenty years in which the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. This may also
imply a change in the behavior pattern of the Latin American private sector in
relation to the state. A way must be fOllnd to "privatize the private sector," that
is, to develop state institlltions, both reglllatory and credit, that cannot easily be
captllred by powerflll special-interest groups.
While increased state investment in hea1th, edllcation, and a social safety net will
help and a more equitable tax system can finance these investments, these steps will
not be enough. Many governments will move toward a European rather than an
American role for the state, that is, a state that is active in pushing for basic social
programs and in offering guidence to industrial developments. This must mean a
stronger role for private firms, in cooperation with government, in providing social
services for their employees and communities. Better-educated and -trained workers
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help their finns to become more competitive, but they also become more effective
citizens who provide better education for their children.
Latin America can feel justifiably proud of finally returning to a period of growth,
after a grim period during the past ten years; however, a sustained economic recovery
based on the twin pillars of liberalization and privatization will be successful only if the
poorest segment of the society is more fully incorporated into the economy.
The post-ISI state, only now beginning to emerge, must focus on the development
of all of its citizens by focusing on its new roleo It must augment and improve the
provision of health, education, and other social services, and it must encourage the
private sector to be a more proactive partner in this challenge for the 1990s.
Notes
1. For a more detailed description of this period, see Glade (1969), chaps. 6-9.
2. A more thorough description of the growth of the state during the ISI process can be found in Baer
(1974; 1989, chap. 11).
3. This section is based on a paper by Baer and Birch (1993).
4. For Mexico, see Ferrer (1991), p. 43; for Brazil, see Baer (1989), p. 129.
5. Public enterprise managers might argue that it was during this period that their owner, the central
govemment, became a liability lOthem. Being forced to borrow beyond their needs and their capacity
lOservice debt interfered with their autonomy and their microcconomic objectives.
6. Wemeck (1986), pp. 566-567.
7. Banco de México,lndices de precios, table IlI-15 (July 1990).
8. For more detailed discussion of monopolistic abuses of state enterprises, see Villela and Baer
(1980).
9. Another example is the case of a government firm like Mexico's CONASUPO, which was
established lO"raise and stabilize income in the rural areas through purchases of agricultural products
and to provide subsidized retail outlets for the sale of basic goods to low-income consumers" (Hill
[1984], p. 385). The inevitable deficit of this organization had to be covered by the state through
either taxes, or decrease in other expenditures or an increase in lhe govemment budgel deficit.
10. Not much of this happened in the 1980s because of the depressed economic conditions in Latin
America, which forced a drastic decline of new inveslmcnt projecls. But thal such forces exist is
shown by the fact that in democratic times lhe location of inveslment projects like Brazil's Volta
Redonda steel mill or the petroleum refineries of state enlcrprises throughout Latin America were in
part determined by regional political interest groups.
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